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OF

all the writers of the transition period between medieval
and modern philosophy, probably no one represents its general
characteristics better than Giordano Pruno. for in his numerous

works, poetical,
tinctive

scientific,

philosophical, are reflected

all

the dis-

features of that period, the revolt against authoritx", the

demolition of

the

sacred and secular,

artificial

division

human and

freedom and the consequent

that

existed

between things

divine, the exultation of intellectual

intellectual

unsettlement and unrest,

the revival of ancient philosophy, as well as the predilection for the

and arts and the despairing tendency to blend the
dreams and vagaries of the imagination with the results of rational
occult sciences

investigation.

Although there
ings, expressive of

is

no systematic

unit}' to his

multifarious writ-

an intellectual enthusiasm and of a mind seeking

and erratic, full of speculations,
propounded on the impulse of the moment or
under the varying influence of the circumstances of the atmosphere
in which he moved, his mind seems to have been dominated by one
central idea, that of the divinity of nature and man, an idea which
he constantly sought to explain and defend by means partly of
Aristotelian categories and parti}' of Neo-Platonic emanation
theories, for above all else he was profoundly sympathetic with the
revolt against the medieval notion of a transcendant God. and a
sphere of divine things absolutely separated from nature and the
During the scholastic period, the course
secular life of mankind.
of religious thought had not only tended to greater obscure the
Christian idea of the unity of the divine and human but the
ecclesiastical conception of God as well had gradually become that
after

truth

}et

undisciplined

theories, conjectures,
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of a Being above the world, to

whom

as the passive recipient of mysterious

thought can be related only

dogmas

vealed, and not of a Being who reveals Himself

Such

spirit.

a false exaltation of the idea of

authoritatively re-

in

and

God

to the

human

could lead to

nothing but the degradation of nature, and the individual and social
Obviously, then, for minds in which the divine was
identified with the supernatural, the observation of nature lost all
religious interest, for to them divine presence was not revealed in the

life

of man.

course of nature but rather in interferences with its laws. For the
same reason, religious life became one of abstraction from the world,

and the secular
gradually came

of man, its domestic, social, political relations,
be recognized as outside the sphere of spiritual

life

to

things.

the

The reaction to
human and the

this false separation of the natural

reawakened

divine, not only

and

spiritual,

interest in nature, as

indicated by the scientific revival of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries,

but gave rise as well

philosophy,

so

distinctively

to

the

characteristic

pantheistic

of

tendency in

Bruno's speculative

was decidedly opposed to the conception of a
supramundane God, and a world in whose life and thought no

waitings for Bruno

seemed to intuitively
discern in the phenomena of the external world in which science had
begun to perceive an intelligible order and law, and in the inner
Instead, he

divine element could be discerned.

world of mind, to whose boundless wealth of thought the consciousness of the time was becoming awakened, the immediate expression
of a divine presence and life and not the mere production of a
distant omnipotence.

from the theologian

"The

he says, "differs
former seeks the infinite Being,
We must begin, in other words,

philosopher,"

true

in this, that the

not outside the world, but within

it.

by recognizing the universal agent in creation, before attempting
to rise to that elevated region in which theology finds the archetype
of created beings."^

The means Bruno employed to give a philosophic justification to
the idea of an immanent relation of God to the world consisted
partly of a recurrence to Xeo- Platonic figures and analogies, partly
in a manipulation of the Aristotelian categories of matter

and of

potentiality

and

actuality, the

and form,

former point of view serving as

the basis for his studied exposition of the notion of a "soul of the

world," by which the universe
^

De

la causa,

Wagner's

edit.,

i.

is
p.

considered as an
175.

infinite,

living

;
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organism, not created by any outward cause, but having within
itself the principle

of

all its

existences and activities, in other words,

being that beyond which nothing exists and

in which all things live,
move, and have their being; and which principle he furthermore
compared to the principle of life in the root or seed, "which sends
forth from itself shoots, branches, twigs, etc., which disposes and

fashions the delicate tissue of leaves, flowers, fruit, and again, by
the

same

things,

interior energy, recalls the sap to the root."

it is,

in

one sense, external for

a part of the thing

To

natural

cannot be regarded as

it

creates, and, in another, internal for

itself

does
of
matter,
wholl}'
on
matter
or
outside
but
from
not act
within, in
the very heart of matter. And again it is represented as an "inner
it

it

from a human artist in
works on matter which is alread\' living or instinct
with form, whereas no such presupposition is invohed in the case of
To him, although we may recoil from viewing the
the former.
universe as a living thing, we can no more conceive any form which
artist" of infinite productiveness, differing

that the latter

is

not already, directly or indirectly, the expression of a soul, than

we can
it

conceive a thing which has absolutely no form.

would be absurd

forms, yet

my

to regard the productions of

table, such,

And though
art as living

though not animate consists not onlv of

matter taken from nature but

is

composed as well of materials

Consequently there

already living.

human

worthless; that does not contain

life

is

nothing, however, minute or

or soul.-

Whereas the human artist works on materials taken from nature,
and which as part of nature already have a life and being of their
own. the divine, or inner artist, has no pre-existing materials on
which to operate His art is therefore creative, of the materials as
well as of the infinitely diversified forms into wdiich thev have been
fashioned.
In Him creative and formative energ\- are the same
and if lower forms should be changed by Him into higher forms of
existence they are not taken from a province foreign to Him but are
already innate with His own life, while the latter are merely a new
;

expression of

its

inexhaustible energy.

utterance, in a slightly varied

This thought finds further
in Bruno's view that

form however,

the ideas of efficient and final cause are inseparable in the divine
artist in contrast
efficient

with the human, for

act presupposes an
2

De

in nature,

cause cannot be separated from the

la

causa,

i.

p.

he contended, the
every reasonable

final as

end or design, that design being "nothing
241.

else
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From which

than the form of the thing to be produced.
that an intelligence capable of producing

all,

follows

it

and of raising them

bv a marvellous art from potentiality into actuality, should contain
in itself the forms and essences of all things."^ As it is intelligence,
or the soul of the world, that creates natural things,
for the formal to be distinct from

the efficient

it is

not possible

cause for the}-

must

unite in the inner principle of things.

In his conception of the world as a living organism,
carried this latter thought

further,

still

Bruno

^^'hereas the conception

outside the materials on which he works in the case of the

lies

human

artist,

it

is

work

the contrary with the design at

in

the

creation of an organized structure, for then the ideal principle, or

formative power, accompanies the matter and constitutes its essence,
such a principle being considered as having been present from the
beginning, inspiring the first minutest atom with the power of the

The

eventual perfect whole.

cause as well as last

;

universe containing within
vast organism, as

it

inner principle, the life within,

and when applied
itself

is first

universe deduces a

to the

the principle of

its

own

being, a

were, in which the least and most insignificant

of finite existences presupposes and manifests the end to be realized,

and

in

which the

first

principle

is

at

once the beginning and end of

Unfortunately, Bruno failed to realize

all.

this conception, yet

when we

all

that

is

contained in

trace the course of his procedure

from

an explanation of God, and His relation
to the world, it is easy to see how, under the limiting influence of the
scholastic categories, the inherent wealth of his own idea escaped
his

fundamental thought

to

him.
In an eiTort to determine the nature of the
things,

Bruno employed the Aristotelian

"matter" saying in part
there

is

no

:

real existence

first

principle of

distinction of

all

"form" and

"Democritus and the Epicureans hold that
which is not corporeal they regard matter
;

and assert that it is itself the divine
nature. These, with the Stoics and others, hold also that forms are
simply the accidental dispositions of matter. ... A closer examination, however, forces us to recognize in nature two kinds of substances, form and matter. If, therefore, there is an active principle
which is the constitutive principle of all, there is also a subject or
passive principle corresponding to it, a something that is capable of
3 Dc la causa,
p. 237.
as the sole substance of things,

i.
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capable of acting.

is

on the surface of things already
but nature operates, so to speak, from the
formed bv nature
center of its subject-matter, which is altogether tmformed. Thereart cannot operate except
.

;

.

.

fore the subject-matter of the arts

matter of natiu'e

is

one,

form."'^

What Bruno

others

that the conceptions of matter

is

manifold, but the subject-

is

seeing that

diversity proceeds

all

from

sought to prove by this passage and similiar

other words, that neither

is

and form are

correlative, in

apprehensible in abstraction from the

and that we are compelled by the necessities of thought to
is neither matter nor form

other,

conceive of a primal substance which
alone but rather a unity of the two.

And

again

we

arrive at the

same result in considering the distinction of substances corporeal
and incorporeal. "It is necessary that of all things that subsist there
But all distinguishable
should be one principle of subsistence.
things presuppose something indistinguishable. That indistinguishable something is a common reason to which the difiference and
distinctive form are added." Furthermore "it is necessar}- that there
be one thing which corresponds to the common reason of both subjects. ... a first essence which contains in itself the principle of its
being. If body, as is generally agreed, presupposes a matter which
is not body, and which therefore naturally precedes that which we
designate as properly corporeal, we cannot admit any absolute incompatibility between matter and the substances which we name
immaterial. ...
If we discern something formal and divine in
corporeal substances, on the same principle we must say that there
.

is

something material

intelligible

.

in divine substances.

world contains an

infinite

.

As

Plotinus sa}S.

if

the

variety of existences, there

must be in them, along with their characteristics difirerences, something which the}' all have in common, and that common element
takes the place of matter as the distinctive element takes that of

common

and immaterial, in
multiple and anyformed, but in itself it is absolutely simple and indivisible; and
because it is all, it cannot be itself any one particular being. "-' Such
considerations are, however, not suggestive of the idea of an
extramundane God but rather "of the soul of the world as the
form.

.

.

.

so far as

•*

5

De
De

This

it

basis of things material

includes a multiplicity of forms,

la causa, p. 251.

la causa,

i.

pp. 269, 270, 272.

is
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all, the potentiality of all, and everything is one."*'
"There is one form or soul, one matter or body, which is the fulfillment of all and the perfection of all, which cannot be limited or
determined, and is therefore vmchangeable.'"^
Though Bruno's aim was to attain to a first principle which
should be the living source and explanation of all finite existences,
material and spiritual, the result of his reasoning was far different
to that which he supposed himself to have reached, for the false
method by which he proceeded led him to a unity which excludes,
rather than comprehends, all determinations an empty abstraction,
and not a being which embraces in its concrete unity the whole in-

actuality of

—

Upon

exhaustible wealth of the finite world.

finding that the ideas

of matter and form, as well as of corporeal and spiritual, cannot be
separately

retained,

he

failed

rise

to

transcends yet comprehends both

to

which

higher unity

a

instead he sought to find his

;

higher unity in that which matter and form, mind and body, have

common when their differences are eliminated.
thinking, like so many others, that he could explain

He

in

erred

in

the differences

and contrarieties of existence by simply eliminating or ignoring
them. xA.nd therefore his first or highest principle (which he identified with God), in which he thought he had reached the origin and
end of all things, became nothing more than the abstraction of
"Being."
If

Bruno's idea of

God were

thus depleted of

all reality,

of the finite world fared no better for the same reason.
a

first principle,

or "soul of the world," in which

should find their being and

reality,

which necessarily implied

at

his idea

In seeking

all finite

existences

he could arrive only to a solution

once the

nihility of

finite

all

beings

apart from God, and their reality in God, for his fundamental notion
of an organic unity

made

it

necessary for him to explain the universe

as an organism in which the parts are simply dead, meaningless fragments in separation from the life or vital principle of the whole, as
well as

showing that through

their relation to that principle they

cease to be such unreal abstractions.

"nature

is

"In

its

externality," he says,

nothing more than a shadow, an empty image of the

principle in

which potentiality and actuality are one.

not nearer to the infinite by being
star rather than sun.
6 Ibid., p. 275.
^ Ibid., p. 280.

And what

I

man

.

.

.

first

Thou

art

rather than insect, by being

say of these

I

understand of

all
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Now,
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these particular

things are not different in the infinite, they are not really different.
It comi)rehends
is still one, and immovable.
and admits of no difference of being, nor of an\' change with
It is all that can be, and in it is no dift'erence of
itself or in itself.
Individuals which continuall\- change
potentiality and actuality.*^

Therefore the universe
all

.

.

.

new manner of being. It is
Solomon has said, 'There is nothing new under the
sun, but that which is was before." As all things are in the imi\erse
and the universe is in all things, as we are in it and it is in us, so all
concur to one perfect unitw which is sole, stable and ever remaining.
E\ery form of existence, every other thing
It is one and eternal.
is vanity, every thing outside of that one is nothing."^
While his
method enabled him to prove the unreality of all finite existences
apart from the first principle, what he could not prove was that
even in their relation to this "soul of the world" any reality was
left to them, for viewed as that which is reached by abstraction from
new

do not take a

existence, but only a

in this sense that

the limits of finite existences, the

first

principle annuls rather than

from God and
though the withdrawal of their finitude makes them one with God
equall}- as well makes them lost in God.
Their finitude

explains them.

is

their distinction

;

In summation, Bruno sought not only to justify for thought the
idea of the absolute unity of

from

itself,

and

in the idea of

all

cause or principle of the world.

union of potentiality and

things but to explain the universe

God endeavored
In him, the

actualit}-

to find the
first

and whether considered as a

:

principle realizing itself in the actual (God), or as
relation to

its

contemplated.

he aimed

—a

principle

And

(Nature),

finally,

^

De
De

it

is

all

actuality in

the same only differently

he failed to reach the result to which

concrete unity, simply because he employed a method

that can yield only an abstract one.

9

immanent

jirinciple is the

la causa,

i.

p. 281.

la causa,

i.

p.

283.

